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POLITICAL REALITIES AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES: WHY CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
IS TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO THE LAWYERS
Kenneth R. Mayer *
I. INTRODUCTION
Professors Ackerman and Ayres deserve credit for making a
provocative and original contribution to the campaign finance re-
form literature. As they correctly note, the history of campaign fi-
nance regulations follows a reform-adaptation-reform cycle that
has become an infinite loop.' Every attempt to control or channel
campaign funds, from the Tillman Act of 19072 to the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002,' produces the same result or is
likely to do so. Candidates, parties, and interest groups change
their behavior in ways that the law fails to anticipate and cannot
keep up with; the regulatory dog is forever chasing, but never
quite catching, its adaptive and evasive tail.4
By rejecting the disclosure-contribution limits paradigm of the
1970s, Ackerman and Ayres offer a campaign finance system that
would consist of two main elements.'
PATRIOT DOLLARS-every registered voter would have a speci-
fied amount of money consisting of fifty dollars initially, divided
among House, Senate, and presidential races,6 that could be do-
nated to federal candidates, political parties, and interest groups
* Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am
grateful for comments by Howard Schweber, Tom Mann, David Canon, and the partici-
pants in the American Politics Brownbag series at the University of Wisconsin.
1. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 8 (2002).
2. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
3. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (to be codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
4. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 8.
5. Id. at9.
6. Id. at 76.
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in each election cycle.7 The money could not be used for any other
purpose, would lapse at the end of the cycle, and would be con-
tributed anonymously.'
DONATION BOOTH-all private contributions must be made
anonymously.9 Instead of going directly to candidates, contribu-
tions would be made to a blind trust, which then forwards them
to candidates without reference to the contributor's identity or
the amounts.1 ° Exceptions would be made for contributions under
$200, and those who gave more than $200 would be identified
only as giving $200 or more.1
The Patriot/donation booth system will, they argue, deliver us
from this cycle, by providing a huge infusion of public funding
into campaigns delivered via millions of distinct citizen acts, and
by severing the informational links that allow officeholders to sell
access and actions to private interests. 2 The turbocharged public
funding system, Patriot, would allow candidates to wage cam-
paigns without relying on wealthy donors, and would dilute the
potency of large donations by creating a flood of small contribu-
tions-perhaps, the authors speculate, as much as $5 billion. 3
Patriot would expand the formal equality of the vote into the
realm of political influence-providing every adult with just one
vote no matter how rich or poor she is.14
The donation booth would alter the terms of the legislator-
contributor relationship. Under the donation booth, contributors
would still be able to claim that they had made a donation, but
they would not be able to prove it.' 5 The concept includes two
wrinkles to further reduce the credibility of these claims. First,
donors can ask for a refund of their contributions within a speci-
fied cooling-off period, so that a canceled check would no longer
suffice as proof.'6 Second, large donations are broken up into ran-
dom-sized chunks and distributed to candidates over time, so that
7. Id. at 70.
8. Id. at 17-18.
9. Id. at 26.
10. Id. at 95-96.
11. Id. at 96.
12. Id. at 8-9.
13. See id. at 7.
14. See id. at 14.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id. at 101.
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an especially large donation would not create a noticeable spike
in what candidates receive. 17 These provisions would create a
"cheap talk" regime in which non-donors could act just like do-
nors."8 Candidates and incumbents could not lavish official favors
or sell access to wealthy donors, since they would never be sure
who those donors really were.19 Donors would no longer be as-
sured of favorable treatment because they could not prove to offi-
cials that they had really given.2 °
What would politics look like under their proposal? They claim
a number of direct and indirect consequences. Corporate pluto-
crats would see their political influence plummet, as they could
no longer rely on huge contributions to pressure politicians.2" Pol-
icy decisions would be determined by the considered and disinter-
ested judgment of legislators and citizens, rather than by who
gave the most money. Pork barrel spending would decline, as
legislators would no longer have an incentive to reward big do-
nors with tax exemptions, subsidies, or the garden variety boon-
doggle.23 Political participation of all forms would rise, because
citizens would reengage with an electoral process that had left
them behind, and because candidates would seek out previously
ignored groups.24 Inequalities in private wealth would no longer
be transformed directly into inequalities in political influence.25
It is in many ways an attractive notion, one that claims to
achieve an egalitarian result through a "bottom up" system of in-
dividual empowerment rather than by coercive controls. At the
same time, and at the risk of validating Longfellow's description
of critics as "sentinels in the grand army of letters, stationed at
the corners of newspapers and reviews, to challenge every new
author,"26 there are a number of serious problems with the Ac-
kerman and Ayres proposal. My objections, once the academic
17. Id. at 104-05.
18. Id. at 6.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 171-72.
22. See id. at 177.
23. Id. at 172.
24. See generally id. at 173-77 (discussing the resulting increase in citizen participa-
tion).
25. See generally id. at 175-76.
26. HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, KAVANAGH: A TALE 57 (Jean Downey ed., Col-
lege & Univ. Press 1965) (1849).
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jargon and high-powered theoretical language is stripped away,
distill to two points.
One, it's a bad idea.
Two, it won't work and will probably do more harm than good.
It is a bad idea because it is based on a number of incorrect
premises and faulty analogies. The Voting with Dollars system is
based on the conceptually flawed axiom that the political process
should-must-be purged of self-interested behavior. In doing so,
it elevates one aspect of American political culture, equality,
above all others and achieves it at the expense of other important
values, especially free speech and individual autonomy. Although
Ackerman and Ayres claim that their plan imposes only minor
burdens on individual rights,27 it actually creates remarkable re-
strictions on associational and speech rights. The analogy drawn
between the secret ballot and the donation booth is flawed,2" as it
fails to recognize the difference between an individual right de-
signed to protect against coercive state action, and a state-
imposed prohibition.
Furthermore, it will not work. Some defects stem from fore-
casts about the likely consequences. In particular, Ackerman and
Ayres have dramatically overestimated the number of people who
will participate in the Patriot system. But this is splitting hairs.
The deeper problems are twofold. First, the Patriot/donation
booth system is inconsistent with the incentives that shape politi-
cal activity, and as such is certain to suffer from the same adap-
tive and evasive forces that have gutted the 1970s reforms. Ac-
kerman and Ayres assert that they have altered these
incentives,2 9 but they have not. Rather, they have only changed
the methods and channels of political influence, and not always in
positive ways. Second, the anonymity principle-the crucial as-
pect of the donation booth, and important to the Patriot system,
too3 -will do little to interfere with credible communication be-
tween interest groups and politicians, will serve mainly to drive
useful information out of the electoral process, and is almost cer-
tainly unconstitutional.
27. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 7.
28. Id. at 6.
29. The structure of the donation booth, they claim, "deprives the two sides [politi-
cians and contributors] of the incentive to hire lawyers to design new forms of evasive
transaction." Id. at 46.
30. See id. at 26.
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One sign that the authors haven't got it quite right is that their
proposal, so simple and elegant at the start, becomes more and
more convoluted as they try to deal with potential objections. One
might call it perfection by algorithm. Structural problems, the po-
tential for evasion, how to handle exploratory campaigns, and so
forth, are dealt with by one complicated formula after another, to
the point where the technical features of the proposal become
more central than the philosophical premise.
My argument proceeds as follows. In Part II, I critique the em-
pirical foundation of the proposal, which is the claim that money
is the root of all evil in the political process. While there is little
use in denying that money plays a key role in political decisions, I
maintain that the link between money and outcomes is far more
complex than the standard reformist argument will allow. What
often looks like corrupt influence often turns out to be something
far more benign. A recognition of this complexity requires a con-
comitant recognition of two resulting circumstances: first, that
driving money out of the process will not necessarily lead to dra-
matic changes in policies or the distribution of political influence,
and second, that the gains achieved by rearranging political in-
fluence come at a potential cost to other important values.
Part III critiques the voting booth/donation booth analogy. Ac-
kerman and Ayres argue that there is nothing radical about tying
the donation booth so closely to the secret ballot. They seek only
to extend the rationale behind the voting booth to the broader
arena of political influence, but they have both overstated the de-
gree to which voting is actually secret and misread the nature
and purpose of the secret ballot. Most surprisingly, they miss the
crucial point that the secret ballot is almost universally consid-
ered an individual right, not an obligation imposed by the state.
The donation booth, in contrast, is a mandatory system forced on
individuals, whether they prefer anonymity or not. This funda-
mental difference undercuts the argument that Voting with Dol-
lars represents a marginal change from existing practices.
Part IV addresses the practical consequences of the proposal.
In order to work, the Patriot/donation booth system must meet
three critical tests. First, enough people would have to participate
in Patriot to direct sufficient public funds into the campaign sys-
tem. Second, the "cheap talk" regime created by the donation
booth would have to truly impede communication between con-
tributors and office-holders. Third, the secrecy regime created by
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1069
the donation booth would have to be effective. None of these is
likely. Participation is unlikely to come anywhere close to what
the authors say they need. Interest groups and legislators will
still find ways to communicate, especially since Ackerman and
Ayres underestimate the role that reputation plays in ongoing po-
litical relationships. The secrecy required by the donation booth is
almost certainly unconstitutional, and would require the govern-
ment to create a new form of classified information requiring the
same sort of protection as the Sensitive Compartmented Informa-
tion ("SCI") that circulates in the national intelligence commu-
nity.
On the whole, the Patriot/donation booth system curtails indi-
vidual autonomy and free speech and will not achieve the goals
that are presumed to make this tradeoff worthwhile.
II. CHALLENGING THE EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION: MONEY AND
POLITICS
The primary justification for the Patriot/donation booth system
is that political decisions are made in a marketplace, the currency
of which is the campaign contribution.31 In the authors' view, po-
litical decisionmakers create policies not through a process of de-
liberation and public accountability, but on the basis of who gives
the money.32 Money purchases official policy, official policies are
made in order to generate future campaign contributions, and
democratic deliberation is replaced by a legislative bazaar in
which access and special interest legislation are openly bought
and sold." Because money is not distributed equally, the wealthy
have disproportionate political influence and they use that influ-
ence to further enrich themselves.34
It is easy enough to find evidence that this is so. Stories of how
well-heeled industries or lobbyists have bought off Congress and
the President at the expense of the public are a staple of the cam-
paign reform literature: insurance industry contributions have
stalled legislation to mandate parity in health insurance coverage
31. See id. at 171-72.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 172.
34. See id.
1074
2003] POLITICAL REALITIES AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 1075
for mental illness; pharmaceutical industry contributions have
prevented efforts to lower the costs of prescription drugs; trial
lawyer contributions have blocked tort reform; contributions from
the financial industry resulted in punitive bankruptcy legislation
that puts credit card debts on the same plane as child support
payments; corporate crooks at Enron, Tyco, Global Crossing, and
WorldCom looted their companies into oblivion, making untold
millions while using soft money to encourage legislators and
regulators to look the other way and leaving workers with worth-
less stock and 401(k)s; and on, and on, and on.
But, as I and others have argued elsewhere, this is a decidedly
simplistic view of the role that money plays in the political proc-
ess. 35 In nearly every instance offered as an obvious example of
how large campaign contributions have purchased legislation or
official policy, closer examination reveals a far more complex set
of motivations and effects. Indeed, the self-evident nature of the
connection between money and policies often appears because the
explanation itself is non-falsifiable. If one begins with the as-
sumption that money drives outcomes, it is necessary only to
choose an outcome and identify the groups that both benefited
from the outcome and contributed money. From there, the conclu-
sion that money determined the outcome follows inevitably.36
The evidence that campaign contributions have a direct influ-
ence on legislator positions or official policy is, despite decades of
research, surprisingly thin. Even the strongest findings of a di-
rect relationship come with numerous qualifications and condi-
tions that limit their generalizability.37
35. See Kenneth R. Mayer, Hey, Wait a Minute: The Assumptions Behind the Case for
Campaign Finance Reform, in A USER'S GuIDE TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 75 (Gerald
Lubenow ed., 2001).
36. One example is an award winning February 2000 article in Time, in which au-
thors Donald Barlett and James Steele claimed that the recycling industry won an exemp-
tion from Superfund liabilities because of campaign contributions to key legislators. Don-
ald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, How the Little Guy Gets Crunched, TIME, Feb. 7, 2000, at
38. What they left out of the story is that the opponents of the liability exemption included
some of the largest corporations in the world-Waste Management, Westinghouse, Gen-
eral Electric, DuPont. See Mayer, supra note 35, at 73. These groups, as well as other
powerful interests, including the National Association of Manufacturers and the American
Insurance Association, unsuccessfully fought to defeat the exemption, and contributed ap-
proximately 200 times more than the recyclers. Id. at 73-74.
37. See, e.g., Stacy B. Gordon, All Votes Are Not Created Equal: Campaign Contribu-
tions and Critical Votes, 63 J. POL. 249 (2001). Gordon's study examines votes in one
committee of the California Senate in the 1987-1988 session. Id. at 254. Gordon finds that
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Despite the lack of strong direct evidence, critics are resistant
to the idea that the connection is not there. After a short review
of this mixed record, historian Paula Baker concludes that: "[i]t is
nonetheless hard to put aside the assumption that large amounts
of money must somehow have a loud voice."3" The strongest ar-
guments about monetary impacts are deductive: given what we
think we know about individual behavior, it is difficult not to be-
lieve that money exerts a disproportionately large effect on policy,
no matter what the evidence might show.
My point is not to deny that money plays an important role in
contemporary politics. Rather, it is that the relationship between
money and political power has more dimensions than the reform
literature is willing to concede. If we accept that the role of money
is complicated, it becomes somewhat harder to believe that driv-
ing it out of the political process-or redirecting the way in which
it enters-would produce fundamental changes in the distribu-
tion of political influence, or different government policy.
United States v. Microsoft Corp.," the antitrust case against
the Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft"), is particularly instructive
in this regard, as it demonstrates the problems in arguing that
neutral processes produce better outcomes than political ones, es-
pecially where money is involved. The case is a window through
which we might see what politics would look like if money was
driven out.
In October 1997, the United States Justice Department and
nineteen states sued Microsoft, accusing the company of violating
antitrust laws and breaking an earlier consent decree.4" The main
allegations were that Microsoft had engaged in anticompetitive
practices by tying its web browser-Internet Explorer-to its
Windows operating system, had acted illegally to maintain its op-
the effect of campaign contributions is strongest on those issues where a handful of votes
are critical to the outcome. Id. at 260. The finding is provocative and may yet apply in
other contexts. Still, the fact that the study refers to a single committee, in one election
cycle, in one state suggests that caution is warranted, as even Gordon recognizes. Id. at
261.
38. Paula Baker, Introduction: Does Money Buy Policy?, in MONEY AND POLITICS 1, 2
(Paula Baker ed., 2002).
39. 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997), rev'd, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Throughout
this discussion, I refer to Microsoft as a unitary actor, even though this is not entirely ac-
curate. The company is made up of thousands of individual employees, managers, and
stockholders, and their interests will not always be perfectly aligned.
40. Id. at 538.
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erating system monopoly, and had abused its operating system
monopoly to crush competing application software-chiefly Net-
scape Navigator." In a series of rulings issued between November
1999 and June 2000, a federal judge found that the company was
a monopoly, had violated antitrust laws, and should be broken up
into two separate companies-one that would make the operating
system and one that would produce application software.42 The
breakup was overturned on appeal, although the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed that Micro-
soft had broken antitrust laws, and the trial judge was removed
from further decisions on the remedy.43 A new judge ordered a se-
ries of settlement talks, and in September 2001 the Justice De-
partment changed its position on the lawsuit and announced that
it would no longer seek a breakup of the company." In November
2001, Microsoft and the Justice Department agreed on a consent
decree outlining the steps that Microsoft would take to remedy
the antitrust violations.4" A federal judge approved the settlement
in October 2002 and denied efforts by several state Attorneys
General to impose more stringent restrictions.46
The Justice Department's decision to abandon its efforts to
break up Microsoft and to opt instead for a settlement is com-
monly explained as the result of the company's lobbying efforts
and campaign contributions. Before the mid-1990s, Microsoft,
like most technology companies, had little presence in Washing-
ton, D.C., but its campaign finance and lobbying efforts grew
41. Rajiv Chandresekaran & Elizabeth Corcoran, U.S. Says Microsoft Violates Anti-
trust Pact, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1997, at Al.
42. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (issuing the
court's final judgment); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000)
(reporting the court's conclusions of law); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d
9 (D.D.C. 1999) (stating the court's findings of fact).
43. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
44. Stephen Labaton, U.S. Abandoning Its Effort To Break Apart Microsoft, Saying it
Seeks Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at Al.
45. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22864
(D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002) (issuing the court's revised proposed final judgment). Not all of the
states have agreed to drop their claims against Microsoft, and they have proceeded with
separate litigation. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Microsoft to Pay Dividends for the First
Time, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2003, at El.
46. New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1233, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21099 (D.D.C.
Nov. 1, 2002) (mem.).
47. See, e.g., Jonathan Krim, Legal Wars Have Changed Microsoft, CEO Says, WASH.
POST, Nov. 13, 2002, at E6; Katherine Pfleger, Political Version of Access Gets Less Micro-
soft Money, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at B1.
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alongside its legal troubles.4" In the 1993-1994 election cycle, Mi-
crosoft gave $109,000 in individual, PAC, and soft money contri-
butions; by the 2000 cycle, this had grown to $4.7 million.49 The
company, which did not even have a Washington, D.C. office until
1995, spent slightly over $2.1 million on lobbying in 1997 and
$6.4 million in 2000, enlisting some of the most powerful influ-
ence brokers in the capital.5" The implication is that Microsoft
spun, bullied, and bought its way out of the legal jam in which it
found itself. 51
Common Cause President Scott Harshbarger set out the sub-
stance of this critique in September 2000:
While Microsoft has legal troubles in the antitrust arena, there's
nothing at all new or illegal about what Microsoft is doing when it
comes to the big money game in Washington . ... In our nation's
capital, money politics is business-as-usual. Indeed, Microsoft seems
to have taken a page from the Phillip Morris playbook, combining
large political contributions with strategic giving to the favorite
charities of lawmakers, substantial support to think tanks that agree
with them, ad campaigns, and other efforts to stir up grassroots sup-
port. What is extraordinary, besides the breadth and speed of the
Microsoft conversion from Washington outsider to consummate in-
sider, is how blatantly and shamelessly and without any sense of
irony Microsoft made the transition.
What is also troubling is Microsoft's attitude towards our judicial
system. It used to be that disputes were settled in court on their
merits. And Microsoft has every right to make the best legal case it
can. But Microsoft hasn't been content to leave this lawsuit in the
hands of the courts. Using political money, the software giant has
tried to bring pressure on the Justice Department's handling of the
case and to win the battle in the court of public opinion.
5 2
48. In 1995, Microsoft founder Bill Gates told the Washington Post, "I'm sorry that we
have to have a Washington presence .... [W]e thrived during our first 16 years without
any of this. I never made a political visit to Washington, and we had no people here. It
wasn't on our radar screen." The Mind Behind the Microsoft Miracle,WASH. POST, Dec. 3,
1995, at H1. Microsoft did not open a Washington, D.C., office until 1995. W. John Moore,
Ganging Up on Microsoft, NAT'L J., Feb. 7, 1998, at 301. For a discussion on the lobbying
activities of high-tech firms generally, see Jube Shiver, Jr., Computer Nerds Are Becoming
Policy Wonks, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1997, at D1.
49. Center for Responsive Politics, Microsoft Antitrust Case: An Update on the Com-
pany's Lobbying and Campaign Contributions, at http://www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v6/
alertv6_26.asp (Sept. 6, 2001).
50. See Center for Responsive Politics, Money in Politics Alert: Microsoft Antitrust
Case, at http://www.opensecrets.orgpressreleases/microsoft/lobby.htm (Sept. 6, 2001).
51. Dan Carney, Microsoft's All-Out Counterattack, BUS. WK., May 15, 2000, at 103.
52. COMMON CAUSE, THE MICROSOFT PLAYBOOK 2-3 (2000), available at
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Harshbarger, echoing a common theme among reform groups, ar-
gues that Microsoft was wrong to use political tactics in fighting
the antitrust lawsuit, and that these efforts succeeded in per-
suading the Justice Department to drop the case for illegitimate
political reasons. 3
Were Microsoft's lobbying and public relations efforts legiti-
mate? If our only concern is with process and formal equality,
then the answer is probably no. Microsoft used its immense
wealth to disrupt the judicial process, and it was able to leverage
its concentrated economic power into a political advantage. Few
people or companies would have the ability to respond by spend-
ing millions on lobbying and billions on philanthropy. Microsoft
was, at a minimum, attempting to use its "inequality of private
wealth" to "distort public deliberation in ways that are inconsis-
tent with our mutual recognition as equal citizens." 4
However, criticism of Microsoft's political activity is based on
the precarious notion that the subjects of coercive state action
must limit their fight to turf chosen by the government. When we
allow for the possibility that the antitrust action was misguided,
politically motivated, or procedurally unfair, the idea that Micro-
soft might take its case out of the courtroom and appeal to legis-
lators or public opinion becomes less troublesome. A corollary is
that cutting off those alternative avenues of appeal is not neces-
sarily a good idea and imposes costs of its own.
If we expand our set of concerns beyond strict equality to in-
clude minority protection against majority rights, or individual
autonomy, it is possible to interpret Microsoft's lobbying in a dif-
ferent light.55 Perhaps Microsoft was engaged in an entirely justi-
fiable response to an unfair use of government power. There is
certainly evidence that the Justice Department was treating Mi-
crosoft improperly-although this evidence is not conclusive.56
http://www.commoncause.org/publications/microsoft/microsoftstudy.pdf; see also Joel
Brinkley, A Huge 4-Year Crusade Gets Credit for a Coup, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at C5.
53. See COMMON CAUSE, supra note 52, at 2.
54. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 13.
55. In any event, Microsoft's efforts almost certainly hurt its cause. In 1999, company
lobbyists pressed Congress to cut $9 million from antitrust division appropriations. KEN
AULETTA, WORLD WAR 3.0: MICROSOFT AND ITS ENEMIES 268 (2001). The effort succeeded
only in provoking Justice Department attorneys into hard-line stances and "furthered [sic]
blackened Gates's and Microsoft's reputations as bullies and brats." Id. at 269.
56. I suspect Professor Ayres, at least, is more sympathetic to the government's case.
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Many antitrust experts and legal scholars pointed to the difficul-
ties of applying antitrust law to the technological integration and
intellectual property issues presented by the Microsoft case.57
Others argued that the remedy was excessive,5" or that the gov-
ernment failed to give enough credence to market forces that
would correct competitive imbalances, thus repeating the mistake
it made in the 1970s IBM antitrust action. 9
The behavior of Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson suggests that
Microsoft was in fact not getting a fair hearing in court. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found
that Judge Jackson had engaged in "deliberate, repeated, egre-
gious, and flagrant" violations of judicial conduct rules, by grant-
ing interviews with reporters during the trial and by seeking to
keep the fact and substance of many of those interviews secret
until the trial was over.6° These interviews revealed what can
only be viewed as an astonishing degree of bias against Microsoft.
Judge Jackson compared company executives to gangland killers
and drug traffickers, openly questioned Bill Gates's credibility as
well as the legal theory behind Microsoft's defense strategy, ex-
pressed confidence in the government's expertise, and implied
that the breakup was analogous to hitting a mule in the head
with a two-by-four to get its attention."' Although the court did
not overturn Judge Jackson's findings of fact or law, it did over-
turn his remedy and disqualify him from further participation in
the case."
See Ian Ayres, Breaking Windows, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 17, 1999, at 18; Ian Ayres &
Aaron Edlin, A Viable Alternative to Breaking Up Microsoft: Compulsory Licensing That
Would Make Microsoft Compete with Its Past Self, FINDLAW'S LEGAL COMMENTARY, Apr.
10, 2002, at http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20020410_edlin.html (last visited Mar.
20, 2003).
57. See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Micro-
soft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 160 (1999); Ed-
ward Rothstein, Wronging Microsoft, COMMENT., Sept. 2001, at 46, 47; Samuel Noah
Weinstein, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 273, 294 (2002). For
a general discussion of the difficulties in applying antitrust law to "new economy" firms,
see Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001).
58. Kenneth G. Elzinga et al., United States v. Microsoft: Remedy or Malady?, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 633, 634 (2001).
59. See John E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 146 (2000).
60. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 107-08 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
61. Id. at 110-11.
62. Id. at 116.
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Despite claims that Microsoft had inappropriately taken the
fight out of the courtroom, the case was undeniably political from
the beginning.63 Microsoft's competitors had been lobbying the
Justice Department for several years to take action. 64 Anti-
Microsoft forces had hired some high-profile lobbyists of their
own, such as 1996 Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole.65
State Attorneys General saw the case as a potential cash-cow,
another tobacco lawsuit that could pour billions of dollars into
state coffers. 66 Also, the Justice Department was, some charged,
particularly concerned about not looking soft on the company,
fearing criticism from other software companies and the states
involved in the litigation.67 That politics played a role in the ac-
tion from the beginning is unexceptional, as it is inevitable in
complex and high-profile cases.6' However, recognition of this fact
undermines the claim that Microsoft was the one who was not
playing fair.
In the end, Harshbarger and other critics may well have been
correct that Microsoft used its political influence to impede the
antitrust action, but this is not necessarily a problem. Although
opinions certainly differ on whether or not the Justice Depart-
ment was doing the right thing, we should hardly expect-much
63. See AULETTA, supra note 55, at 268.
64. Fred McChesney and William F. Shugart II argue that rival lobbyists had tried to
convince the Federal Trade Commission to initiate an investigation of Microsoft and that
they shifted to the Justice Department and Congress when their first tactic failed. Fred S.
McChesney & William F. Shugart II, The Unjoined Debate, in THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 341, 344 (Fred S.
McChesney & William F. Shugart II eds., 1995). "The DOJ's intervention in the Microsoft
investigation," according to the authors, "occurred only after calls from Capitol Hill to
Anne Bingaman, President Clinton's Assistant Attorney General for antitrust." Id.
65. Heather McCabe, Anti-Microsoft Group Enlists Bob Dole (Apr. 21, 1998), available
at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,11798,00.html.
66. See Steven Levy & Michael Hirsh, A Blow to the Empire, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 5, 1998,
at 58, 59.
67. AULETTA, supra note 55, at 3-27.
68. See William J. Baer & David A. Balto, The Politics of Federal Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 111, 129 (1999).
There is political support for both sides in almost every antitrust case, thus
diluting the public choice argument that politics drives enforcement deci-
sions. Public choice advocates conveniently point to political support on one
side or the other to support their theory that decisions were politically moti-
vated. They can then argue that any expression of political interest or pres-
sure corrupts the enforcement decision, even if there is no evidence that the
decision was actually based on it.
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less require-one of the world's largest corporations to sit quietly
while the government attempted to dismantle it. 69
How might the antitrust case have played out under the Ac-
kerman and Ayres system? It is possible that the lawsuit might
never have been brought in the first place if Microsoft's competi-
tors had not been able to press the point without their own cam-
paign contributions and lobbying efforts. Microsoft would have
been barred from making soft money contributions to the parties,
and its political action committee ("PAC") would have had to raise
its money via Patriot dollars and make contributions through the
donation booth. Additionally, individual contributions from Mi-
crosoft employees under this system would have been anonymous.
This would, if Ackerman and Ayres are correct, reduce the com-
pany's political clout. However, neither the donation booth nor
the Patriot system would have had any bearing on the company's
lobbying, public relations, or philanthropic efforts; we might even
expect a more intense campaign in those areas, if the donation
booth had cut off the traditional avenues of political influence.
Microsoft might have engaged in a vigorous issue ad campaign on
behalf of (or against) sympathetic (or hostile) legislators. The
election of George W. Bush-or Elizabeth Dole, if we accept the
scenario Ackerman and Ayres lay out in chapter eleven 7° -would
have meant a more market-oriented antitrust policy, and it is en-
tirely possible that a settlement rather than a breakup would
have occurred in any event.71
But the key question is this: Would the decisions made in this
process, under the Patriot/donation booth system, be any more
likely to be based strictly on the merits? Given the ambiguities in
the state of antitrust law as it applies to high-tech industries and
intellectual property, I strongly suspect the answer to this ques-
tion would be no. Even in the absence of any "political" considera-
tions, the lawsuit's progression might have been determined as
69. Ironically, Microsoft's arguably inept legal strategy and courtroom tactics were
often attributed to a naive belief that it would get a neutral and fair hearing in the legal
arena. See generally AULETTA, supra note 55, at 210-27. "In this sense," wrote Ken Au-
letta, whose interviews with Judge Jackson were to play a key role in the appeals court
disqualification, "they [Microsoft] were legal nerds, who believed vindication would be
found in their temple of pure facts." Id. at 220. Microsoft intensified its lobbying and pub-
lic relations efforts when it concluded that this was not the case. See id. at 223-27.
70. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 164-71.
71. See id. at 160-78.
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much by personality disputes between the principals, the opinion
of Justice Department attorneys and the judge that Microsoft was
arrogant, or the fact that Bill Gates gave a terrible deposition, as
by ostensibly neutral factors. 
7 2
I do not claim to offer a definitive analysis of either the state of
antitrust law or the merits of the case against Microsoft. But my
description raises the possibility, at least, that "politics" might
have served the constructive purpose of correcting mistakes made
by one branch of the government, that money is not always the
root of all political evil, and that efforts to redistribute political
power are not "free."
III. CHALLENGING THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION: IS THE
DONATION BOOTH ANALOGOUS TO THE VOTING BOOTH?
The primary philosophical justification advanced for the dona-
tion booth is that we cast our ballots under precisely this veil of
anonymity-since the introduction of the Australian ballot in the
1880s, virtually all voting is conducted secretly.73 We have no
verifiable record of how we vote, so we cannot prove to anyone
that we actually cast our ballot one way or another.
A key cause-though certainly not the only one-of the ballot
reform movement was the desire to stamp out the corruption and
intimidation that occurred when voters cast ballots under the
watchful eyes of party regulars.74 Political parties produced sepa-
rate ballots that they distributed to voters outside polling loca-
tions, and these ballots were printed to make it easy to see how
people voted.75 Votes were sometimes bought outright, and voters
at times faced intimidation by employers and party officials or
threats from violent mobs.76 The abuses of the time have been
well-documented, although they were not as frequent as we might
think.77 The secret ballot was an ideal solution to these problems.
72. The Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division, Charles James, denies
that politics played any role in his decision to change strategies. See Drew Clark, Behind
the Microsoft Deal, NAT'L J., Nov. 17, 2001, at 3603, 3604.
73. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 143 (2000).
74. Id. at 159.
75. Id. at 28.
76. See id. at 160-61.
77. Id. at 159. Keyssar, in his definitive history of voting, notes that "recent studies
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Once political parties could not observe how individuals voted,
the incentive to strike corrupt bargains disappeared.
Why not, the thinking goes, extend this reasoning to campaign
contributions? Both the secret ballot and the donation booth tar-
get "quid pro quo" corruption; the only difference is what is up for
sale. The secret ballot prevents parties and candidates from pur-
chasing the official act of an individual voter, while the donation
booth prevents contributors from purchasing the official act of an
elected official. If the secret ballot diminished vote buying and in-
timidation directed at voters, why wouldn't secret contributions
have the same effect on officeholders?
The resulting situation [of the donation booth] will be structurally
similar to the one created by the secret ballot. Protected by the pri-
vacy of the voting booth, you are free to go up to George W. Bush and
tell him that you voted for him enthusiastically in 2000 even though
you actually voted for Al Gore. Knowing this, neither the president
nor you will be prone to take such protestations seriously.
The same "cheap talk" regime will disrupt the special-interest
dealing we now take for granted. Just as the secret ballot makes it
more difficult for candidates to buy votes, a secret donation booth
makes it harder for candidates to sell access or influence. The voting
booth disrupts vote-buying because candidates are uncertain how a
citizen actually voted; anonymous donations disrupt influence ped-
dling because candidates are uncertain whether givers actually gave
what they say they gave.
78
The secret ballot-donation booth comparison is central to the
whole idea behind Voting with Dollars. It is also an anchor point
for the proposition that the donation booth would pass constitu-
tional muster.79 If secret voting is constitutional, 0 then why
would secret contributions be any less acceptable? If the secret
ballot is an unexceptional and non-controversial element of our
have found that claims of widespread corruption were grounded almost entirely in sweep-
ing, highly emotional allegations backed by anecdotes and little systematic investigation
or evidence . . . . Most elections appear to have been honestly conducted: ballot-box stuff-
ing, bribery, and intimidation were the exception, not the rule." Id. at 159-60.
78. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 6.
79. Id. at 3-11.
80. Ayres has argued elsewhere that he "cannot conceive that the Supreme Court
would strike down this form of mandated anonymity as unduly burdening voters' free
speech rights." Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Ano-
nymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 886 (1998).
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political system, broadening it poses few theoretical or practical
problems. It is, in their words, the "master analogy.""1
But the voting booth and the donation booth are distinct in
ways that undercut the claim that the "donation booth promises
the effective control of existing pathologies without eliminating
the positive features of private choice." 2
There are three key differences between the secret ballot and
the donation booth. The first is that the secret ballot does not
prevent candidates from learning a great deal about where their
support lies. Elections produce far more information than a sim-
ple vote total or percentages. States invariably break the vote
down by precinct, 3 a level of detail which permits finely honed
analyses of voting behavior.84 The individual ballot may be secret,
but that veil does not keep the careful analyst from making reli-
able inferences from the wealth of data that is available. The vot-
ing booth does not stop candidates from identifying their core
constituencies, which they presumably will favor with attention
and benefits.8" It is a mistake, then, to conclude that the voting
booth severs the informational connection between voters and
candidates.
But a second, more substantial difficulty lurks. The donation
booth/voting booth comparison ignores the principle that the se-
cret ballot is a personal right that a voter can waive. The state
cannot compel me to reveal my vote, but neither may it prevent
me from doing so if I choose. The donation booth, in contrast, is a
mandatory state-imposed obligation that permits me no choice in
the matter.
81. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 154.
82. Id. at 25.
83. It is interesting to note that there are 531 precincts in Palm Beach County, Flor-
ida alone, which was the epicenter of the 2000 presidential election dispute. See, e.g.,
Bruce E. Hansen, A NonParametric Analysis of UnderVotes in the Palm Beach Presiden-
tial Vote: Implications of a Recount 3 (Nov. 19, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison), available at
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/-bhansen/vote/florida4.pdf.
84. Id. at 4; Jonathan N. Wand et al., The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Bu-
chanan in Palm Beach County, Florida, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 793, 793-94 (2001).
85. Note, The Dimensions of the Right To Vote: The Write-In Vote, Donald Duck, and
Voting Booth Speech Written-Off, 58 Mo. L. REV. 945, 965-66 (1993). "As it stands, elec-
tion results provide a wealth of information. Parties crunch and tabulate election results
to identify strongholds and weak territories for themselves and their opponents." Id.
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A century of legal theory and jurisprudence supports the posi-
tion that the secret ballot is a personal right that protects the in-
dividual from coercion by the government, political parties, and
employers-to name a few. As such, voters are free to say-and in
many cases, to prove-how they voted. One author concluded that
"[p]ublic policy requires that the veil of secrecy should be impene-
trable, unless the voter himself voluntarily determines to lift it;
his ballot is absolutely privileged." 6 With few exceptions, state
courts have adopted the same standard. In Jenkins v. State Board
of Elections of North Carolina,7 the court explained that
[the] privilege of voting a secret ballot has been held to be entirely a
personal one. The provision has been generally adopted in this coun-
try for the protection of the voter and for the preservation of his in-
dependence, in the exercise of this most important franchise. But he
has the right to waive his privilege and testify to the contents of his
ballot. The voter has the right at the time of voting voluntarily to
make public his ballot, and its contents in such case may be proven
by the testimony of those who are present.
8 8
Similarly, in McDonald v. Miller,9 the court reasoned that
[t]he guaranty of secrecy in exercising the right to vote is one per-
sonal to the voter. He has a right to insist that knowledge of his deci-
sion at the polls remain his own. Under our system it is a constitu-
tional privilege which cannot be withdrawn by law. It is nonetheless
a privilege personal to the voter. If he desires to waive it, he may.
The mere fact that the voter permits someone else to learn for whom
he voted does not destroy the validity of the vote.
90
Another example is contained in Lett v. Dennis.9' The court in
Lett stated that "the statutory provisions for preservation of se-
crecy of the ballot is for the protection of the voter against the
conduct of others, and in no manner is intended as restrictive of
any voluntary act of his own."92
A number of federal courts have reached the same conclusion.
In upholding the practice of allowing federal officials to observe
86. 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 1376 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1927) (1868).
87. 104 S.E. 346 (N.C. 1920).
88. Id. at 347-48.
89. 90 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1956).
90. Id. at 127.
91. 129 So. 33 (Ala. 1930).
92. Id. at 35.
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the manner in which illiterate voters received- assistance, a fed-
eral district judge concluded "[it. .. appears that the secrecy of a
ballot can be compromised provided it is done at the request of
the voter."93
There is an argument to be made that secret ballots should be
compulsory if the concern is preventing fraud, and most states
invalidate ballots which are marked in ways that could identify
specific voters. 94 In Nabors v. Manglona,95 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed its opinion that
ballots marked with code names-part of a vote-buying scheme
discovered in a 1985 Northern Marianas Island election-
probably should have been thrown out.96 The court was concerned
not only with fraud, per se, but also the fact that a vote identifica-
tion scheme affects those who choose not to participate in it, since
their votes become more identifiable. The case for compulsory
secrecy relies heavily on the premise that secrecy is necessary to
93. United States v. Democratic Party of Greene County, 254 F. Supp. 543, 546 (N.D.
Ala. 1966).
94. For an example of state ballot requirements, see N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 7-106
(Consol. 1986 & Supp. 2002) and VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-613 (Cum. Supp. 2002). Some state
statutes, moreover, explicitly prohibit voters from showing their completed ballot to any-
one in the polling station. For example, Minnesota Statutes section 204C.17 (2000) states
that:
Except as authorized ... a voter shall not reveal to anyone in the polling
place the name of any candidate for whom the voter intends to vote or has
voted .... If a voter, after marking a ballot, shows it to anyone except as au-
thorized by law, the election judges shali refuse to deposit the ballot in any
ballot box and shall place it among the spoiled ballots. Unless the showing of
the ballot was clearly intentional, the voter shall receive another ballot ....
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204C.17 (West 1992).
In many cases, however, state courts have interpreted this type of language loosely. To
illustrate, in In re Application of Langbaum, the court stated that the secrecy of the ballot
"is more of a personal right of the voter than a risk to the integrity of the process. Voiding
the ballot and thus disenfranchising the voter is too harsh a remedy where the deficiency
does not affect the integrity of the electoral process." 493 A.2d 580, 583 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985). I have been unable to locate a single case in which a voter's ballot was
thrown out because he or she displayed it.
95. 829 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1987).
96. See id. at 905. The court asserted that
[a] system of placing identifying marks on voters' ballots for the purpose of
monitoring their electoral choices is repugnant to the democratic principles
upon which the United States, the Commonwealth, and our common system
of secret ballot elections are based. There can be absolutely no justification
for such a scheme. It constitutes a direct subversion of the freedom to vote as
one chooses.
Id.
97. Id.
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protect individual voters from surveillance and potential retribu-
tion.98 Not every state court subscribes to the idea of the secret
ballot as an individual right, 99 but most do. °°
In many cases, moreover, the vote is not secret at all. Under
federal law, voters with disabilities and those who are illiterate
are permitted to have assistance from a person of their own
choosing, as long as that person is not the voter's employer or un-
ion representative.1 ' Arkansas's state constitution requires paper
ballots to be numbered in order to permit election officials to con-
nect specific ballots to individual voters if an election is con-
tested.0 2 In closed primaries, where only registered members of a
political party are eligible to vote, voters must reveal their parti-
san preferences before being provided with a ballot. 0 3 Oregon,
which now conducts its elections entirely by mail, requires voters
to place their ballots in a secrecy envelope before sending them in
to election officials.' 4 Nevertheless, votes are still counted even if
voters fail to adhere to this rule.0 5
A joint MIT-Caltech study of voting systems in the 2000 elec-
tion noted that "[t]he two primarily mail-in techniques (absentee
voting and all-mail voting) are fundamentally not secret bal-
lots. ,106
Courts have long noted the lack of secrecy inherent in absentee
balloting,0 7 but none has ever held that this problem by itself vio-
lates constitutional or statutory provisions that mandate secret
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Mass. 1982). The
court stated: "Since ballot secrecy safeguards society's interest in the integrity of elections,
we hold that the right to a secret ballot is not an individual right which may be waived by
a good faith voter." Id.
100. Id. (citing Wehrung v. Ideal Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 N.W.2d 68, 69 (N.D. 1956);
Belcher v. Mayor of Ann Arbor, 402 Mich. 132, 134 (1978)).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6 (2000).
102. ARK. CONST. amend. 50, § 3; Doug Thompson, Traceable Ballots Come Under Fire:
Secretary of State Plans Drive To Make Arkansas Voting Truly Secret, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Nov. 26, 2000, at B1. For a case interpreting Arkansas's constitutional provi-
sion, see Womack v. Foster, 8 S.W.3d 854 (Ark. 2000).
103. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-467 (West Supp. 2002).
104. See OREGON SEC'Y OF STATE, OREGON'S VOTE BY MAIL PROCEDURES MANUAL 29
(2002).
105. Id.
106. CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT IS, WHAT COULD BE
38 (2001), available at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/index.html.
107. See, e.g., State ex rel Hutchins v. Tucker, 143 So. 754, 755 (Fla. 1932).
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ballots. For example, in Hutchins, the Supreme Court of Florida
held that an absentee voter has waived his right to a secret ballot
altogether. 0 8 As a rule, voters have every right to show their
completed absentee ballots to just about anyone.0 9 Again, clear
evidence of this proposition comes from state case law-in this in-
stance, a 1982 California Court of Appeal decision:
[I]f a voter wishes to disclose his marked ballot to someone else, be it
a family member, friend-or a candidate's representative, he should be
permitted to do so .... We suspect that many absentee voters dis-
close their marked ballots to other persons before placing them in
the identification envelope for return to the elections official or the
polling place. Such a voluntary disclosure cannot be deemed to vio-
late the constitutional mandate [of secret ballots]. 110
The transparency of the voting booth under these circum-
stances is hardly trivial, given the increasing popularity of absen-
tee balloting and mail-in votes. In the 2000 election, over 2.7 mil-
lion Californians voted absentee, nearly one-fourth of all votes,'11
and 1.56 million Oregon voters cast mail-in ballots." 2 In Wash-
ington state, over half of all ballots are cast absentee." 3 Nation-
wide, about one out of every seven votes was cast outside polling
places in 2000.11 It is true that absentee voting is more suscepti-
ble to electoral mischief than the voting booth, but the problems
have less to do with the lack of secrecy than with classic ballot
box stuffing/fictitious voter fraud."5
Let me agree, for the sake of argument, that the secret ballot is
in fact a form of compelled anonymity. Even so, the donation
booth/voting booth analogy is still inaccurate because of a third
distinction between the two. The specific act of casting a vote is
108. Id. at 756. Current Florida election rules specify that an absentee voter who re-
turns her ballot by fax machine "will be voluntarily waiving [her] right to a secret ballot."
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 15-2.030(11)(e) (2002).
109. See, e.g., Beatie v. Davila, 183 Cal. Rptr. 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
110. Id. at 183.
111. Cal. Sec'y of State, Historical Absentee Ballot Use in California, at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/hist absentee.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
112. 2000 General Election Statistical Summary, at http://www.sos.state.or.
us/elections/nov72000/other.info/genstats.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
113. Wash. Sec'y of State, Absentee Statistics, at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/
absentee stats.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
114. CALTECHIMIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, supra note 106, at 36.
115. Susan Schmidt & John Mintz, Gore Case Spotlights a Trend in Remote Voting: As
Use of Absentee Ballots Mushrooms Nationally, So Does Potential for Fraud, Electoral Ex-
perts Say, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2000, at A27.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1069
very different from what goes on in the far more amorphous and
broad campaign environment, and is subject to a much higher de-
gree of state control. In campaigns, voters assimilate the informa-
tion they want in order to make the decision about which candi-
date to support; candidates attempt to mobilize their supporters,
persuade the undecided, attack each other, and make promises
about what they intend to do once elected. Campaigns are often
about tactics, artifice, rhetoric, spin, and even outright false-
hoods. Rather than police this activity, we leave it to the voters to
sort through everything. Voting, in contrast, involves the discrete
mechanisms of choice, the specific administrative processes, and
the counting rules that determine the winner of a particular con-
test.
We draw distinctions between political arguments and cam-
paign rhetoric-largely unregulated as part of the "marketplace
of ideas"-and the physical process of marking and submitting a
ballot, which is far more carefully controlled. A congressional
candidate who stood outside a polling place handing out $20 bills
would probably be indicted for vote fraud. A candidate in the
same race who says she would introduce a bill to cut taxes by
$1000 per household is guilty of nothing more than making a
campaign promise.11
Thus, the state can exercise much more control over the voting
process than it can over the campaign process.1 7 Restrictions on
political speech that are permissible inside and around the poll-
ing place are not permissible beyond that.118 Consequently, even
if it were established beyond a doubt that the secret ballot was
mandatory, it does not follow that similar restrictions would be
legal in other contexts.
The secret ballot comparison-the master analogy-is thus
more rhetorical than analytical, relying as it does on a highly
stylized and inaccurate picture of the voting booth. Voters, it
116. In Brown v. Hartlage, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a candi-
date who promised to serve at a reduced salary and return the savings to voters through
lower taxes did not violate a law that banned vote-buying. 456 U.S. 45, 58-62 (1982).
117. The Supreme Court has adhered to this distinction in two key cases. In Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), the Court upheld restrictions on electioneering within a
narrow zone in and around polling places. Id. at 211. Also, in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214 (1966), the Court overturned an Alabama law prohibiting the solicitation of votes on
election day. Id. at 220.
118. See supra note 117.
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turns out, cast their ballots in a variety of circumstances with the
degree of ballot secrecy dependent almost entirely on what the
individual voter chooses to keep secret. 19 Ackerman and Ayres
thus misidentify the nature of the right to a secret ballot-it vests
with the individual voter, not the state.120 The authors fail to ac-
knowledge this difference. The voting booth/donation booth anal-
ogy obliterates the distinction between "I have no obligation" and
"I am prohibited." It is, therefore, a weak foundation for the en-
tire system proposed in Voting with Dollars, and exposes the do-
nation booth as the essence of the type of "command and control"
regulation that the authors claim to eschew.'12
IV. CHALLENGING THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: PARTICIPATION,
CHEAP TALK, AND SECRECY
A. How Many People Will Participate?
While Ackerman and Ayres are agnostic as to the precise num-
ber of people who will participate in the Patriot program,
throughout the book they repeatedly assert that candidates will
have access to at least $5 billion in Patriot dollars.'22 While they
do not specify how many people would have to participate for the
program to work, they do note that a participation rate of twenty
percent would be "a disaster,"'23 and that their "initiative would
be a failure if fewer than fifty million voted with their Patriot dol-
lars.""'24 The operating assumption is that most, if not all, of the
100 million people who vote in presidential elections would use
their Patriot allocations.
How realistic are their expectations? Predictions of a signifi-
cant increase in participation rely on what the authors call the
119. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
121. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 4.
122. Ackerman and Ayres state that "$5 billion or so would be coming into the cam-
paign through the patriotic system." ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 7. They later
assert that there would have been an implied 'yield of approximately 5 billion Patriots" if
the system had been in place for the 2000 elections, given the 100 million persons who
voted. Id. at 83. Moreover, they suggest that despite cutting the flow of private money, the
system "will still yield a pool of $6-7 billion." Id. at 120.
123. Id. at 84-85.
124. Id. at 175:
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"citizenship effect."125 Under the Patriot system, voters would
have a new reason to become engaged in politics, especially if
they are able to see the collective impact of their participation.
126
To this end, Ackerman and Ayres assert that in using the Patriot
system, "Americans will be giving renewed social meaning to
their self-understanding as free and equal citizens, engaging in
democratic deliberation."
1 27
Are they overly optimistic? Despite their claim that the Patriot
system and the donation booth are so simple as to rejuvenate
civic participation, the actual proposal asks a lot of voters. The
funding scheme is unusually complicated, with different amounts
credited to the card on different dates depending on the election
cycle, whether or not there is a contested primary, whether an in-
cumbent president is running for reelection, whether a candidate
withdraws, and how many Patriot dollars and private funds were
spent in the previous cycle.
21
Voters will have to be particularly attentive under the Patriot
system, because they will never be completely sure exactly how
much money they can give (or have left), will have to go to special
offices to see that their contributions have been accurately dis-
tributed, and will have to make multiple contributions in several
different races in order to use up their entire allotment of Patriot
dollars. The plan imposes some obligations-individuals must
register with the Federal Election Commission ("FEC").'29 In or-
der to receive a Patriot card, individuals must register to vote or
vote in those states that do not have pre-registration-Wisconsin
and North Dakota. 130 Voters can register by mail or over the
Internet, provided that they respond within thirty days to the
confirmation letter sent to their home address and activate their
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 181-85.
129. Id. at 67. This requirement represents a basic shift in the function of voter regis-
tration. For the first time, the process will be used for something other than ensuring
voter eligibility and determining where people should vote. The administrative difficulties
involved in meshing fifty different state registration systems with a single federal data-
base are considerable. Leaving that aside, we ought to be skeptical about such a funda-
mental transformation-centralized federal control, the use of registration systems to de-
termine who is eligible to contribute to campaigns-in the manner in which these data are
handled.
130. Id.
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card using a special code.131 To take advantage of the ATM dis-
bursement option, voters must present an existing ATM, credit,
debit, or government benefits card that is folded into the Patriot
system. 132 Voters with multiple ATM or credit cards will have to
remember which card is tied to the Patriot system, and will also
have to reapply every time a linked card is cancelled or an ATM
account changes, unless the voter requests that the company roll
the voter's campaign finance account over to another card.133 One
can easily imagine millions of voters, even after taking the con-
siderable time to figure out where they are supposed to go and
what they are supposed to do there, giving up after unsuccess-
fully rooting around for their cards-which will not, given the in-
frequency of their use, be carried in purses or wallets.
Ackerman and Ayres argue that most people would choose the
linked-ATM option,1 34 which solves the problem of losing cards
that are used a few times every two years and the hurdle of trav-
eling to a special office to make contributions. They assert that
"[tihe only voters who will request free-floating cards are people
without any electronic alternatives-and these, as we have seen,
are not numerous."135 I suspect, though, that they have underes-
timated the amount of resistance that will attend this linking of
private commerce with official government functions and political
activity.
There is some empirical evidence about what might occur with
the Patriot system. Minnesota has a contribution refund program
that is identical in many respects to the Patriot plan.1 36 Any indi-
vidual can contribute up to fifty dollars to a state candidate and
131. Id.
132. Id. at 67-68.
133. These are not trivial problems. According to an industry web site, credit card
holders possess an average of six-and-a-half cards per person. See U.S. Payment Card In-
formation Network, CardFAQs, at http://www.cardweb.com/cardlearn/faqs/2001/nov/
20.amp (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). If we include all types of credit cards, the average
cardholder possesses nearly ten cards. See id., at http:/www.cardweb.com/cardlearn/faqs/
2002/jun/6.amp (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). Electronic Fund Transfer cards and credit
cards are often linked, so a single card may be tied to multiple accounts. Nearly 100 mil-
lion credit cards are cancelled each year, and 150 million new cards issued. See id., at
http:/www.cardweb.com/cardlearn/faqs/2002/jun/lO.amp (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
134. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 68.
135. Id.
136. See Minn. Revenue, Political Contribution Refund, at http://www.taxes.state.mn.
us/individ/taxinfo/33pol.html (last modified Dec. 10, 2002) (describing the refund program
in Minnesota).
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receive a refund from the state department of revenue.137 Only
candidates who agree to accept public funds and the attendant
spending limits may receive these contributions, which are in ef-
fect free to the individual. 131 In the 1999-2000 election cycle,
169,283 refunds were issued.139 The actual number of individuals
who participated is probably slightly higher, since married cou-
ples who contribute $100 are counted as having made a single
contribution. 140 In 2000, Minnesota had a voting age population of
3,547,000.141 This means that 4.8% of eligible people participated
in the Patriot-like political contribution program; participation
rates in the 1998 and 1996 election cycles were, respectively, 4.6%
and 4.5%.142 This participation level is an order of magnitude less
than what would be necessary to make the Patriot system work.
Participation would have to be five times higher even to reach the
level of "disaster."4
3
Ackerman and Ayres argue that the Minnesota case is not
comparable to the Patriot system, since obtaining the Minnesota
refund requires paperwork and refunds take time. 4 4 "Patriot is
different, allowing citizens countless opportunities to use their
Patriot dollars at their ATMs without bureaucratic hassle."145 But
obtaining a Patriot card can be much more complicated than get-
ting a refund in Minnesota, and candidates there do everything
they can to make the process as easy as possible for contributors.
The Minnesota electorate is highly engaged, with turnout rates
usually running about twenty percentage points higher than the
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Minn. Campaign Fin. and Pub. Disclosure Bd., Participation in Political Contribu-
tion Refund Program, at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/pcrprog.html. (last vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2003) (listing participation rates by candidate and party). To arrive at this
figure, the author accessed the table under "candidate" and "Political Party" for the years
1999 and 2000 and added the "Grand Total" figures in the "Number of Contributions" col-
umns of each of the four tables. See id.
140. See Minn. Revenue, supra note 136.
141. Office of the Minn. Sec'y of State, Minnesota State Primary Statistics 1950-2000,
at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/election/elstat94.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
142. See Minn. Campaign Fin. and Pub. Disclosure Bd., supra note 139; see also Office
of the Minn. Sec'y of State, supra note 141 (citing sources on voting age population and
turnout); FED. ELEC. COMM'N., Voter Registration and Turnout Statistics, at
http://www.fec.gov/elections.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (listing national participation
statistics).
143. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 85.
144. Id at 262-63 n.33.
145. Id.
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national average. 4 6 For example, in 2000, the presidential elec-
tion turnout was the highest in the country at 69.4%,147 whereas
turnout nationally was 51.3%.14s Even if we discount the low par-
ticipation levels because state-level contests typically generate
less attention than national elections, it is a reasonable inference
to conclude that Minnesota reflects an upper bound on foresee-
able participation rates. 149
B. Cheap Talk and Reputation Effects
A-perhaps the-foundation of the donation booth concept is
that non-donors must be able to behave exactly like donors, so
that candidates cannot ever be completely certain who really gave
them money and who is lying. If potential donors want to receive
the purported benefits of contributing-access, favorable legisla-
tion, et cetera-without actually bearing the cost of donating,
they can simply claim that they donated. In the presence of such
free-riding and without proof one way or the other, candidates
would have no way of being certain which claims were true and
which were not. Ergo, nobody gets special treatment because of a
donation.
The donation booth can only work-absent authoritarian and
patently unconstitutional prohibitions on telling a candidate that
you have made a contribution-if candidates are sufficiently con-
fused by this cheap talk regime.
146. For a comparison of voter turnout nationally and in Minnesota in the 1996 elec-
tions, compare Fed. Elec. Comm'n., National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections, at
http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003), with Fed. Elec.
Comm'n., Voter Registration and Turnout-1996, at http://www.fec.gov/pages/96to.htm
(last visited Mar. 20, 2003). See also supra note 142.
147. Office of the Minn. Sec'y of State, November 7, 2000 General Election Official Re-
sults, at http://elections.sos.state.mn.us/ENR2000_General/ElecMenu.htm (last visited
Mar. 20, 2003).
148. Fed. Elec. Comm'n., Voter Registration and Turnout 2000, at http://www.fec.gov/
pages/2000turnout/reg&toOO.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
149. The three-dollar United States income tax checkoff, used to fund the presidential
election campaign fund, is another benchmark. See Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act of 1966, tit. III, § 302(a), Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1587 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6096
(2000)). Checking this box on an income tax return simply designates three dollars to the
fund, used to provide matching grants and public funding to presidential candidates. Id.
Yet only about 12% of all filers participated in 2001, even though doing so is effortless and
cost free. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAXPAYER USAGE STUDY FOR TAX YEAR 2001,
available at http://www. irs.gov/pub/irs-solotpusct.xls (last modified Jan. 7, 2003).
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Both theory and practice, however, suggest that candidates will
not face such confusion. Even under an anonymous system, com-
mitted donors will still have incentives to be honest with candi-
dates, and non-donors will face compelling disincentives against
misrepresentation. In a political environment where ongoing rela-
tionships are vital to both candidates and interest groups, the de-
sire to be seen as credible will, over the long term, provide a pow-
erful reason for interest groups to tell the truth.15 °
Cheap talk falls into two categories: (1) claims made by people
who are purposely trying to inject confusing information into the
election; and (2) those made by otherwise credible contributors
who want to obtain influence or access without actually spending
any money. Legislators and candidates are unlikely to be con-
fused by the first type of false claim, although voters might be. No
sensible politician will believe the National Rifle Association
("NRA") if it claims to have given money to Representative Caro-
lyn McCarthy (D-NY),"5' or Barbra Streisand if she says she con-
tributed $10,000 to George W. Bush's reelection committee. 15 2
Those claims will not do Barbra Streisand or the NRA any good,
either, since the chief result is that their own credibility will be
undermined.
It is the second type of false claim that is more interesting, and
more likely. Will candidates truly be confused by cheap talk? How
hard will it be for a candidate to assess the credibility of a claim,
either public or private, that a donor gave $10,000?
Not hard at all, as it turns out. Consider that after ten years, or
however long a period before records are revealed for auditing
purposes, everyone knows that a false statement is certain to be
exposed.'53 When a false claim becomes known, the people who
made it will see their credibility drop to zero in all future interac-
tions, as well as face retribution from politicians who will be un-
150. See generally Joel Sobel, A Theory of Credibility, 52 REv. ECON. STUD. 557 (1985)
(discussing the importance of credibility and the behaviors that effect one's credibility).
151. Robin Joner, Presidential Race Could Turn on Bush's Appeal to Women, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2000, at Al. The Congresswomen is quoted as saying "'you can take on the
N.R.A. and win' in a comment made to the Million Mom March. Id.
152. Political Capital: Hoping To Jump-Start His Campaign for Governor, Grossman
Airs TVAds, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2002, at B5.
153. Some claims would be identifiable as false prior to this-a person who claimed to
have given $100,000 to a candidate who only raised $50,000 over an entire election cycle
would be exposed quickly as a liar.
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happy about being duped. Even those donors who indeed want to
send confusing signals would benefit by a longstanding pattern of
honesty, because that reputation would enhance the credibility of
a false claim if it is ever made, and even a single false claim
would raise doubts about a donor's true activities." 4 Nobody with
long term stakes in the political process will be willing to risk
this.
The cheap talk regime, then, assumes that there are no reputa-
tional consequences to lying. This is flatly contradicted not only
by bargaining theory,'55 but also by overwhelming evidence that
virtually everyone involved in striking political bargains is
acutely aware of the importance of reputation.'56 Indeed, reputa-
tion is central to political deals precisely because most are unen-
forceable if one party fails to hold up her end of the bargain.'57
Ackerman and Ayres assert that "after ten years, the data will
be too stale for donors and politicians to use as a basis for future-
oriented dealings."' This is not so. The public might not care,
but it is a certainty that parties, legislators, candidates, and in-
terest groups will. They will sift the data carefully, so that they
can assess the credibility of the "cheap talk" that they are cur-
rently hearing.
The most likely consequence of the donation booth is that it
would deprive the public, but not the candidates, of information
regarding donations. Large donors would simply make their
154. See generally Barry Nalebuff, Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World, 43
WORLD POL. 313 (1991) (discussing how reputation and misperception can lead to an in-
fringement of payoffs).
155. See, e.g., Jeong-Yoo Kim, Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated Pretrial Nego-
tiation, 27 RAND J. ECON. 787 (1996) (discussing reputation and broken promises in the
context of pretrial negotiation); Anne Sartori, The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory
of Communication in International Disputes, 56 INT. ORG. 121, 140 (2002); Sobel, supra
note 150, at 557-73 (arguing reliability can be communicated through action and credibil-
ity is achieved by correctness).
156. See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS
(1990); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 49-67 (2000); Terry Sullivan, Bargaining
with the President: A Simple Game and New Evidence, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1167 (1990)
(pointing to the fact that some people make misrepresentations unsystematic, which
avoids "nicks" to their reputations); see also Nalebuff, supra note 154 (focusing on the role
of reputation in establishing deterrence in the world).
157. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Con-
gress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON.
132, 138-40 (1988).
158. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 99.
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claims privately to candidates. These private signals would still
be credible, and candidates would still know with reasonable cer-
tainty who is giving to them. But, the public would be in the dark.
Currently, even though the public might not know what interest
groups say to candidates, we do know what they give. Under the
blind trust regime, neither communications nor contributions
would be publicly visible. This is not a step forward.
Moreover, to the extent that the cheap talk regime works, it
will have the effect of driving valuable information out of the elec-
toral arena. If candidates are to be confused about the identity of
their real contributors, then it is axiomatic that voters will be
even more so. The advantages of disrupting potential corruption
must therefore be balanced against the disadvantages in forcing
voters to make choices without important cues.
A significant literature attests to the importance of information
shortcuts, or cues that voters use to evaluate candidates when de-
tailed information is hard to come by or absorb. 59 Key among
these is the identity of a candidate's supporters. Such cues allow
otherwise unsophisticated and uninformed voters to act ration-
ally, in the sense that they can make the same decisions that they
would have made if they had invested considerable time investi-
gating the issues.6 ° Interest groups have the incentive and the
ability to evaluate political information about a candidate's pref-
erences, behavior, history, and policy positions.16' Ackerman and
Ayres dismiss this notion with the assertion that "[r]esearchers
have yet to find an election ... in which information about fund-
ing actually made a difference in the outcome."162 Even if true,
this misses the point. Elections need not turn on this information
for voters to find it useful. 63 Candidates certainly behave as
though this information matters, and one of the first steps in any
159. See Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behav-
ior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 63 (1994) (discuss-
ing how voters encounter information surrounding referendums).
160. See id.
161. Id. at 65-67; see SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION
AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 216-17 (1991) (analyzing a reasoned voter
and the steps they take to obtain information to simplify choosing candidates in the elec-
tion process).
162. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 250 n.2.
163. One reason that contribution data is less useful than it might be is because of the
delay in reporting. Quicker disclosure will almost certainly enhance the effect of this in-
formation.
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campaign research effort is a study of where the opponent's
money comes from.'64
A group's willingness to commit its resources to a candidate is
an unambiguous signal of where it stands, and knowledge about
who has given money can be vital to a voter's evaluation of a can-
didate. For example, has the candidate made donations to
EMILY's List,'65 or the Conservative Victory Fund? 66 Handgun
Control Inc.,' 67 or the NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 ' or National
Abortion Rights Action League 9 or Right to Life? 7° Driving this
information out of the campaign, or intentionally introducing con-
fusion, seems unlikely to improve the election process.
C. A New Category of Government Secret?
No matter how much attention is devoted to the process of
maintaining the confidentiality of contribution data, some unam-
biguous, traceable, and authoritative record of each transaction
would have to exist. The need for such definitive records is obvi-
ous, as without them it would be impossible to carry out the au-
dits necessary to insure that contributions go where the donors
intended, apply contribution limits, or enforce any kind of source
restriction, such as a ban on foreign or corporate contributions.
164. John Bovee, How To Do Opposition Research on the Internet, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, Sept. 1998, at 48. Many special interest group websites list voting records of
incumbent candidates. Id. There are also campaign contribution reports online so one may
examine where a candidate received his or her funding. Id.
165. See EMILY's List, Who is EMILY, at http://www.emilyslist.org (last visited Mar.
20, 2003) (defining the organization as a group of women who raise money for women
candidates).
166. See Conservative Victory Fund, Organization, at http://www.conservativevictory
fund.org/about.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (stating that the organization's purpose is
to elect conservatives to the United States Senate and House).
167. See The Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, at http://www.handguncon
trol.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (explaining the need for gun control under the crusade
of former White House Staff member Jim Brady).
168. See Nat'l Rifle Assoc., Political Victory Fund, at http://www.nrapvf.org (last visited
Mar. 20, 2003) (giving financial support to legislators who support the association's posi-
tions).
169. See Nat'l Abortion Rights Action League, About Us: The NARAL Pro-Choice Amer-
ica Mission, at http://www.naral.org/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (sup-
porting a woman's right to choose).
170. See Nat'l Right to Life, Mission Statement, at http://www.nrlc.org/missionstate
ment.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (stating that the goal of the organization is to pro-
tect innocent human life).
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Many people-hundreds, possibly thousands-would need routine
access to this information, and the donation booth system would
have to mesh closely with existing financial institutions to insure
that contributions are properly debited from donor accounts.
It is thus a given that the information will exist, and no en-
cryption code or organizational wall could keep names separate
from dollar amounts forever. How, then, do you protect it from be-
ing revealed? The procedural solution offered in Voting with Dol-
lars is to limit the number of people with access to the data, pro-
hibit trust employees from fraternizing with candidates or
campaign staff, and to insist that under no circumstances would
donor names be revealed beyond the $200 threshold.'71 Ackerman
and Ayres also propose criminal penalties. Section 21 of the Citi-
zen Sovereignty Act, Ackerman and Ayres's model statute, pro-
vides for criminal penalties of up to five years in prison and a
$25,000 fine for violating "any provision" of the act.1 2 Ayres has
suggested that the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") should
be authorized to conduct field audits to see if campaigns and
trusts are willing to compromise donor anonymity. 17 3
It is not at all clear how such rules would work, and even less
clear that they could be enforced. Ultimately, the blind trust re-
gime would have to be more airtight than the national security
classification system. Otherwise it is inevitable that those with
access to the information would find a way to transmit it to can-
didates or the public. In the extreme case, trust employees could
simply provide documents to reporters or candidates, or selec-
tively disclose particular contributions through leaks. The dismal
track record of restrictions on the dissemination of political in-
formation-such as leaks of Voter News Service exit poll data and
the total flouting of the French ban on the broadcast of public
opinion polls within one week of elections-should engender con-
siderable skepticism that contribution records would be kept un-
der wraps.'74 Once the information is out, the government is to-
tally powerless to do anything about it.
171. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 183-85.
172. Id. at 216-17 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 21).
173. Ayres & Bulow, supra note 80, at 860 n.2.
174. Between 1977 and 2002, French law prohibited the publishing of public opinion
polls within one week of an election, though it was legal to conduct them. Les sondages
electoraux pourront etre publies jusqu'a la veille du scutin [France Approves Last-Minute
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The possibility of private traffic in contribution data leads to all
manner of pathologies. Candidates may seek damaging informa-
tion about their opponents, in the hope of exposing contributions
from out of favor interests or individuals. Alternatively, they
could simply assert that their opponents have taken tainted
money, and the same restrictions which prevent a candidate from
knowing who has given her money will prevent her from proving
that she has not received suspect funds. In addition, absent full
disclosure, the public would be denied the information necessary
to evaluate the competing claims.
The notion that criminal penalties will be applied to the release
of contribution data is nothing less than shocking, and belies the
claim that Voting with Dollars represents minimal restrictions on
speech. There is neither a coherent legal foundation nor any
precedent for punishing the disclosure of campaign contribution
data. The donation booth requires the creation of a completely
new category of government secret-data on how much individu-
als contributed to federal candidates. Restrictions on the disclo-
sure of this top-secret information would have to be backed up
with penalties analogous to those applied to the unauthorized re-
lease of national defense information.
No contemporary category of information currently protected
from unauthorized disclosure by the government provides any
support to the donation booth concept of coercive secrecy. This
covers a broad range of material: autopsy photographs of
NASCAR driver Dale Earnhardt; juvenile offender records; Inter-
nal Revenue Service flags for auditing income tax returns; insider
trading information; census responses; student academic records;
Polling on Election Eve], AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 16, 2002 [hereinafter France Ap-
proves Last Minute Polling]; see Charles Trueheart, French Voters Pluck Forbidden Polling
Data from the Internet, WASH. POST, May 23, 1997, at A36. The rise of the Internet, which
allowed voters to access foreign web pages not affected by French law, made the statute
unenforceable. See France Approves Last Minute Polling, supra; see also Trueheart supra.
Legislators reduced the blackout period to twenty-four hours in January 2002. Threats by
Voter News Service ("VNS") to sue anyone who leaked its exit polls did not prevent wide-
spread Internet distribution. See Jacob Weisberg, Exit Poll Madness, SLATE, (Nov. 7, 2000)
at http://slate.msn.com/?id=1006436. Jack Shafer points out the hypocrisy of news anchors
pretending not to know the election results, when in fact they have already seen VNS pro-
jections by early afternoon on election day and know who has won. Jack Shafer, All the
News That's Fit To Suppress, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2000, at A26. Despite the VNS em-
bargo, "[aill day long, media and political elites fill their friends' e-mail and voice-mail
boxes with the latest numbers. The exit-poll numbers are the worst-kept secret in the
world." Id.
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judicial disciplinary proceedings; grand jury testimony; individual
banking, medical, or tax records; trade secrets; classified national
security or intelligence information; diplomatic communications;
nuclear weapons data; even secret ballots. At stake with every
other type of privileged information is an individual privacy right,
a property or proprietary interest, or a specific harm to vital gov-
ernment functions, such as national security or law enforcement,
that would result from release. In many cases, the information
that the government must keep secret can be released by the per-
son who originated it.175 In others, the government cannot be
forced to release information, as with claims of executive privi-
lege, but is free to do so.
Nothing of the sort applies to the donation booth, in which the
parties to a particular contribution would, presumably, want the
information released, but are prevented from doing so. In no way
can the consequences of releasing contribution data be compared
to the harm in releasing information on a law enforcement inves-
tigation or a diplomatic initiative, nor can it be claimed that re-
lease would interfere with efficient governmental administration.
There is no legitimate, let alone compelling, interest in keeping
this information confidential.
Ackerman and Ayres defend the legality of the donation booth,
arguing that there is no inherent right to obtain government re-
cords. The First Amendment "has never operated as a sword re-
quiring the government to hand over all information in its pos-
session."176 However, they overstate the government's ability to
keep secret whatever it wants. Although federal courts have ruled
that "[t]here is no inherent constitutional right of access to gov-
ernment information,"177 other court decisions have placed impor-
tant limits on this power. In McGhee v. Casey,17 1 the D.C. Circuit
added a key qualification, concluding that "citizens have no first
amendment right of access to traditionally nonpublic government
175. Political candidates often release their income tax returns; patent applications are
confidential, but nothing prevents an inventor from revealing that he has submitted an
application; individuals may waive their privacy rights with census data or academic re-
cords; and so on.
176. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 148.
177. Pfeiffer v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, No. 91-736 (NHJ), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2650, at *12 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 1994).
178. 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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information." '179 The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that "[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amend-
ment mandates a right of access to government information or
sources of information within the government's control." 0 Justice
Brennan argued that "[tihese cases neither comprehensively nor
absolutely deny that public access to information may at times be
implied by the First Amendment and the principles which ani-
mate it."'
The conditional nature of the government's power to classify in-
formation poses several problems for the donation booth. Contri-
bution data is not information that has been traditionally private,
given the broad sweep of campaign finance disclosure laws in the
twentieth century. 82 Nor is contribution data truly within the
government's control, as the government neither originates the
information nor keeps it private. Decisions about where the
money goes and how much is given, are made by private indi-
viduals, and this information is used to distribute campaign
funds to other private individuals."3 At the very least, the dona-
tion booth runs against the grain of decades of progress in sun-
shine laws and other guarantees of government openness.
Here, Ackerman and Ayres make another erroneous compari-
son, arguing that donation booth secrecy is analogous to the se-
crecy of the census forms. 184 There are two crucial differences,
though. First, completing the census form is mandatory, and in-
dividuals face prosecution if they refuse to participate.1 8 5 The gov-
ernment requires individuals to provide the information, and
there is no right to opt out. 8 6 The fact that the information is
kept secret is one reason that courts have held that this require-
ment does not violate privacy rights.8 7 Second, there is no law
which prevents an individual from showing her completed census
179. Id. at 1147 (emphasis added).
180. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (emphasis added).
181. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
182. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding the dis-
closure requirements, limits on campaign contributions, limits on political expenditures,
and public financing of elections in the Federal Election Campaign Act).
183. See 11 C.F.R. § 9034.1 (2002).
184. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 148-49.
185. 13 U.S.C. § 221 (2000).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1962).
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form to anyone, and individuals are free to waive their privacy
rights."' 8 Once again, the authors fail to recognize the distinction
between state coercion and a positive grant of individual rights.
Although the government probably does have the right to fire
trust employees for revealing what they know by making confi-
dentiality a condition of employment, it is hard to see how sanc-
tions could be applied to former trust employees. The prohibitions
are so broad that they would undoubtedly chill protected speech.
Take, for example, the hypothetical case of a current trust em-
ployee who knows the identity of contributors and recipients.
Next consider the following two statements made by that em-
ployee to, say, a Washington Post reporter, or on CNN:
(1) "Bill Gates contributed $25,000 to Senator Smith in 2004."
,(2) "Bill Gates is a credible person who tells the truth about his
politics. If he says he's going to do something, he'll do it. If he
says he did something, he did it."
Under the Citizen Sovereignty Act, the first statement would
clearly be illegal since it violates section 8(b)(1).8 9 However, what
about the second statement? There is no reference to a specific
contribution, although the statement might run afoul of the "any
other information about any contributor" prohibition. 9 ° If this
subjects the employee to prosecution or dismissal, the statute
covers a sweeping amount of political speech and almost certainly
runs afoul of the First Amendment. If not, the donation booth
leaves open many opportunities to convey valuable information
about what is going on behind the curtain.
Consider the case of a trust employee blowing the whistle on a
false contribution claim. If John Doe, a prominent CEO, falsely
claims to have given $50,000 to a Senate candidate, and a trust
employee publicly states that this claim is false, is there a viola-
tion? If the claim is really false and no contribution has been
made, then there is no "contributor or contribution to the blind
188. 13 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
189. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 199 ("No employee may disclose the amount
or status of specific contributions or the identity or any other information about any con-
tributor or contribution.") (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(b)(1)).
190. Id. (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(b)(1)).
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trust"1 91 to trigger any secrecy requirements, and trust employees
are free to debunk at will.192
In fact, under the logic of the donation booth, there is no reason
to bar any statements by trust officials about contributions or re-
cipients. What the donation booth is designed to prevent is proof
of contributions, not speech about whether a contribution has
been made, or how much, or by, or to whom. Mere knowledge that
a contribution has been made is insufficient grounds to prohibit
statements about it, since an individual who makes a contribu-
tion to the blind trust knows with certainty whether or not it has
in fact been made. An individual who proclaims her $10,000 do-
nation to Senator Smith has no more proof of her contribution
than does a trust employee who says that the contribution has ac-
tually been made. Under the donation booth, the credibility of
those claims is identical, since neither one is verifiable. What is
missing is proof that a contribution has been made and not re-
voked. What is the basis then, for restricting the speech of trust
employees, as opposed to the release of actual records? There is
none.
From a practical standpoint, the Patriot/donation booth is un-
likely to achieve its goals. Ackerman and Ayres overstate the
simplicity of their plan and the degree to which it will revitalize
participation. The donation booth will not disrupt credible com-
munications between candidates and donors, but will merely
drive those signals underground. The plan creates an entirely
new category of government secret, along with all of the coercive
controls that accompany it.
But, protest Ackerman and Ayres, "[wie are not in the business
of restricting speech. We are interested only in enhancing the ca-
pacity of all Americans to join the debate .... [T]here is never
any effort to repress speech in the name of equality."'93 This as-
sertion is unambiguously false because under the Pa-
triot/donation booth, private citizens are denied the ability to
prove their support for a candidate. 94 Furthermore, voters are
denied information about the identities of a candidate's support-
191. Id. (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(a)).
192. This would not be the case, of course, if Doe claimed to have given $50,000 but ac-
tually gave, say, $500.
193. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 92.
194. Id. at 98-99.
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ers and candidates are even denied information about the identi-
ties and intensities of their own supporters. 195 Government em-
ployees-current, and perhaps former-are prohibited, under
pain of criminal sanction, from revealing information that has,
until now, been considered crucial in evaluating the qualities of
candidates and government policy.'96 The claim that these policies
do not amount to coercive restrictions on speech cannot be taken
seriously.
V. CONCLUSION
Ackerman and Ayres claim to offer a novel way of removing the
pernicious elements of our campaign finance system with little or
no cost to essential liberties. I have attempted to argue that they
are wrong in this position. My objections to their plan are both
philosophical and practical. The proposal, far from reflecting a
modest change, requires a fundamental rearranging of how the
electorate and government relate to one another.
The Ackerman and Ayres prescription requires us to elevate
political equality as the only-and if not the only, certainly the
most important-goal of our campaign finance system.'97 In the
context of democratic politics, though, there are other values long
considered crucial in the theoretical underpinnings of American
political culture. These values include fair determination of pref-
erences, individual autonomy, free speech, and protecting minor-
ity rights against the tyranny of the majority. 9 ' None of these, or,
195. Id. at 94.
196. Id. at 98-100.
197. "It isn't enough to count every vote equally on election day. The American citizen
should also be given a more equal say in funding decisions." Id. at 4. 'Even when our votes
count equally, inequality of private wealth may distort public deliberation in ways that are
inconsistent with our mutual recognition as equal citizens." Id. at 13. 'No less than the
abolitionists, we envision democratic politics as a distinct sphere of equal citizenship." Id.
at 32. Under the Patriot system, "[wihenever the share of private contributions exceeds
one-third of the whole, we consider this a dangerous sign of incipient oligarchy." Id. at 89.
A participant in the Patriot system "will be doing his bit to carve out a special space for
democratic citizenship-in which ordinary people confront one another as equals as they
hammer out the basic terms of their ongoing social contract." Id. at 161.
198. Political equality and popular sovereignty are not absolute goals; we must
ask ourselves how much leisure, privacy, consensus, stability, income, security,
progress, status, and probably many other goals we are prepared to forego for
an additional increment of political equality. It is an observable fact that almost
no one regards political equality and popular sovereignty as worth an unlimited
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for that matter, any other values can be maximized without some
cost to the others. Furthermore, it is the institutions and proc-
esses of American politics that are designed to achieve a balance
among them.
A system that enforces equality of both vote and influence ignores
the benefits of complementary, rather than consistent, government
structures. Madisonian governmental design had complementary
features that balanced the limitations of one aspect with strengths of
another. For example, the equal vote populism of the House of Rep-
resentatives was balanced against the state-based inequalities of the
Senate. Similarly, the parochialism of the legislature was balanced
against the national perspective of the executive. The trend in re-
form has been to make the features of United States Government at
the state and national levels more consistent rather than comple-
mentary. But, this consistency comes at the cost of balance and may
in the long run magnify inherent weaknesses in the system. For in-
stance, decisions might become overly responsive to ill-formed ma-
joritarian preferences. 199
In the end, what appears to motivate Ackerman and Ayres is a
deep suspicion of politics-as the term is commonly understood-
as a way of making public policy or resolving important dis-
agreements. The prospect of voters, interest groups, and politi-
cians brazenly pursuing their self-interest, rewarding constituen-
cies, or pandering to local biases quite obviously makes them
uncomfortable. Politics, when viewed through this lens, inevitably
corrupts what would otherwise be a rational and consensual pro-
cess, diverting official judgments away from what everyone
should recognize as the common good. Government benefits-i.e.,
tax breaks, contracts, favorable regulatory decisions, and subsi-
dies-are purchased by the politically connected and wealthy.
Election campaigns, rather than processes of mobilization and ac-
countability, are a flagrantly unfair means through which power-
ful special interests and unbeatable incumbents manipulate vot-
ers through an onslaught of dishonest television advertising.
Campaign money is literally the legal tender through which these
fraudulent practices are conducted.
sacrifice of these other goals.
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Ackerman and Ayres would much prefer that policy emerge
through careful deliberation, among equals, over what is in the
public interest. This conceptual framework justifies attempts to
impose a particular kind of normative rationality on politics and
campaigns, in which voters and candidates set aside all bias and
deliberate solely on the basis of policy rather than self-interest.
This view has a long and distinguished lineage. James Madison
argued that "[tihe aim of every political Constitution is or ought
to be first to obtain for rulers, men who possess most wisdom to
discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the soci-
ety. . .""' He also expressed his hope that the new government
would be composed of "men who would be able to pursue vigor-
ously what they saw to be the true interest of the country free
from the turbulence and clamors of 'men of factious tempers, of
local prejudices, or of sinister designs."'2 1 It is entirely consistent
with the Burkean view of the legislator as trustee and Parliament
as "a deliberative Assembly of one Nation, with one Interest, that
of the whole; where, not local Purposes, not local Prejudices ought
to guide, but the general Good, resulting from the general Reason
of the whole."2" 2
Ackerman and Ayres subscribe to this view that the public in-
terest should dominate the deliberative process. Their's is a rea-
sonable normative position, but they run into trouble when they
explicitly try to purify politics of self-interest.
It is clear that this is what they would like to do. Throughout
Voting with Dollars, Ackerman and Ayres repeatedly attack the
notion that individuals or groups would use the political process
to advance their own economic, social, or geographic interests,
and defend the Patriot/donation booth as a way of making this
much harder. They state that "[a]s Americans look a generation
or two ahead, they will find it impossible to predict whether the
new paradigm will further their concrete interests. They are
obliged to consider the problem from behind a veil of ignorance
that deprives them of personal self-interest."2 3 Under the Patriot
200. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 289 (James Madison) (Bantam Classic ed., 1982).
201. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 505
(1969) (quoting a letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 1787)).
202. Edmund Burke, Speech After the Poll to the Electors at Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), in 3
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE, 64, 69 (Paul Langford et al. eds., 1996).
203. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 176.
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plan, "[mlost patriotic PACs will tend to define themselves over
issues that transcend local self-interest."2"4 The "donation booth
tends to filter out self-interested contributions, while allowing an
unimpeded flow of ideological gifts,"20 5 and also protects an indi-
vidual who chooses to make a contribution, because "she has no
fear that her extra gift can be disparaged as an effort at pursuing
her self-interest. The context makes it clear that she is making a
genuine gesture of concern for the fate of her country."20 6
There is a difference between a political system that does noth-
ing but advance private over public interests, and a political sys-
tem that seeks to channel self-interested behavior in productive
ways. The rationale for creating a system of checks and bal-
ances-the primary characteristic of our constitutional struc-
ture-was precisely to take advantage of the self-interested moti-
vations of most political actors and to prevent abuses. James
Madison wrote "[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambi-
tion."20 7 The notion that a political system can-or should-be
purged of self-interest is shortsighted, and reflects a deep misun-
derstanding about the basic forces that motivate political behav-
ior. As historian Alan Brinkley has persuasively argued:
The belief that a pure "public interest" exists somewhere as a kernel
of true knowledge untainted by politics or parochialism, and that it
provides not just an array of basic principles but a concrete set of so-
lutions to complex problems, is an attractive thought. But it is also a
myth. We may be able to agree on a broad framework of beliefs capa-
ble of organizing our political life, but any such framework will have
to make room within it for conflicting conceptions of how to translate
those beliefs into practice.
20 8
Not even the Framers succeeded in elevating the "general
good" over localized, sectional, or other self-interested concerns.
From the first days of the new Congress, fights over tariffs, as-
sumption, industrialization, agriculture, and even slavery were
dominated by members seeking to advance their constituents' in-
terests.2 9
204. Id. at 173.
205. Id. at 37.
206. Id. at 34.
207. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Bantam Classic ed., 1982).
208. Alan Brinkley, The Challenge to Deliberative Democracy, in THE NEW FEDERALIST
PAPERS 23, 26 (Alan Brinkley et al. eds., 1997).
209. KENNETH R. MAYER & DAVID T. CANNON, THE DYSFUNCTIONAL CONGRESS 46-50
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Of course, there is nothing wrong with encouraging citizens
and voters to take the broader view. The difficulty that Ackerman
and Ayres face, though, is that their solution seeks to impress
that view through coercive prescription and proscription. They
may believe that they are creating only modest impositions, but
they are wrong. In the interest of promoting equality, they pile
one government coercion upon another: limits on speech and as-
sociation, government secrecy backed up with criminal penalties,
heightened investigations of contacts between interest groups and
public officials, and elimination of information cues about candi-
dates and interest groups.
Ultimately their framework is built on the flawed assumption
that very nearly denies the possibility of sincere policy prefer-
ences or the validity of expressing philosophical support or oppo-
sition through a campaign donation. In return for significant re-
strictions on individual rights, we stand to purchase an
ineffective regime. This is not a deal worth making.
(1999).
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